Lower bounds and resource allocation by Giménez Gómez, José Manuel et al.
 
Lower bounds and resource allocation 
 
 
José Manuel Giménez Gómez 
Josep E. Peris 
María José Solís Baltodano 
 
 
Document de treball n.12- 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
Col·lecció “DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL DEL 
DEPARTAMENT D’ECONOMIA - CREIP” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  DEPARTAMENT D’ECONOMIA – CREIP 
                          Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
UNIVERSITAT
VROVIRA I IRGILI 
DEPARTAMENT D’ECONOMIA 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
     
 
Edita: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adreçar comentaris al Departament d’Economia / CREIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN edició en paper: 1576 - 3382  
ISSN edició electrònica: 1988 - 0820 
 
 
 
 
 
DEPARTAMENT D’ECONOMIA – CREIP 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
 
Departament d’Economia 
www.fcee.urv.es/departaments/economia/publi
c_html/index.html 
Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Facultat d’Economia i Empresa 
Av. de la Universitat, 1 
43204  Reus 
Tel.: +34 977 759 811 
Fax: +34 977 758 907 
Email: sde@urv.cat 
CREIP 
www.urv.cat/creip 
Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Departament d’Economia 
Av. de la Universitat, 1 
43204 Reus 
Tel.: +34 977 758 936 
Email: creip@urv.cat 
 
UNIVERSITAT
VROVIRA I IRGILI 
DEPARTAMENT D’ECONOMIA 
Lower bounds and resource allocation
Jose´-Manuel Gime´nez-Go´meza, Josep E. Perisb
and Mar´ıa-Jose´ Sol´ıs-Baltodanoc
aUniversitat Rovira i Virgili, Departament d’Economia and CREIP,
Av.Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain. (josemanuel.gimenez@urv.cat)
bUniversitat d’Alacant, Me`todes Quantitatius i Teoria Econo`mica (MQiTE)
and Institut Interuniversitari Desenvolupament Social i Pau (IUDESP),
03080 Alacant, Spain. (peris@ua.es, subiza@ua.es)
cUniversitat Rovira i Virgili, Departament d’Economia and CREIP,
Av.Universitat 1, 43204 Reus, Spain. (mariajose.solis@urv.cat)
Abstract
The existence of lower bounds that guarantee a minimum to each agent involved in an allocation
(claims) problem has been widely analysed in the literature. When focusing in claims problems, four
lower bounds in what any individual should receive are the minimal right (Curiel et al., 1987), the fair
lower bound (Moulin, 2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004) and the min lower bound
Dominguez (2013). In the current paper we impose that a mechanism should fulfill one of the mentioned
lower bound (we call this property respect of the lower bound, RB) and compare the mechanisms obtained
by using RB together with some additional properties. We provide new characterizations of the so-called
uniform rules (constrained equal awards, constrained equal losses) and the Ibn Ezra’s proposal.
Keywords: claims problems; lower bounds; claims rules
1. Introduction
The so-called claims problem reflects a situation where the aggregate
claim of a group of individuals is greater than the resources to be distributed
among them. The way of rationing the endowment among the agents, taking
into account their claims, is prescribed by a rule. In the current paper we
analyze how to distribute any increment of the endowment in terms of two
general concepts: equal treatment and warranty (which is determined by a
lower bound on what an agent receives).
The concern of ensuring some minimum individual rights has figured in
a large number of contexts. Specifically, the Universal Basic Income is a
classical issue that has attracted most of the attention in the social policy
literature and the political agenda during the last two decades (Noguera,
2010). The establishment of a minimum wage in the labour market, or the
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debate of ensuring a universal minimum health coverage in the U.S. Senate,
are another examples. Furthermore, the idea of establishing warranties un-
derlies the theoretical analysis of claims problems from its beginning (O’Neill,
1982) to present day (Gime´nez-Go´mez and Marco-Gil, 2014).
In Dominguez (2013) the recursive application of a lower bound is anal-
ysed and some claims rules are characterized by using some additional prop-
erty. Instead of applying recursively the lower bound, we only ask that the
proposed solution fulfills this bound, that is it assigns to each individual at
least the amount determined by the lower bound.
Moreover, we impose some additional requirement that depends on the
lower bound being used: conditional equal treatment, conditional resource
monotonicity, conditional group solidarity, or priority.
Then, a crucial point in our study is the selection of a particular lower
bound with respect to which the above mentioned properties are applied.
Since we are interested in comparing lower bounds among agents, we need
to choose a significant one, in the sense that it should be di↵erent from zero,
whenever the claim is. We analyse four lower bounds defined in the litera-
ture: the minimal right (Curiel et al., 1987), the fair lower bound (Moulin,
2002), securement (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004) and the min lower
bound Dominguez (2013). The impact of requiring that s claims rule ful-
fills a lower bound is analysed in Dominguez and Thomson (2006) and Yeh
(2008).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section presents
the model and introduces the lower bounds. Section 4 introduces the axioms
and provides our main results. Finally, Section 5 closes the paper.
2. Preliminaries
Throughout the paper we will consider a set of agents N “ t1, 2, ..., nu.
Each agent, i P N , is identified by her claim, ci, on some endowment E ° 0.
The aggregate claim, C, is given by C “ n∞
i“1
ci. A claims problem appears
whenever the endowment is not enough to satisfy the aggregate claim, that
is, C ° E. Without loss of generality, we assume that the agents are indexed
according to their claims, c1 § c2 § . . . § cn. The pair pE, cq P R`` ˆ Rn`
represents the claims problem, and B denotes the set of all claims problems.
A rule is a single valued function ' : B Ñ Rn` such that for each pE, cq P B,
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and each i P N , fulfills 0 § 'ipE, cq § ci (non-negative and claim-bounded),
and
n∞
i“1
'ipE, cq “ E (e cient).
Two of the most important rules proposed by the literature are the uni-
form ones (Maimonides, 12th century): the constrained equal awards rule
(that recommends an equal distribution of the endowment subject to that
no one receives more than her claim) and the the constrained equal losses
rule (that recommends an equal loss of the claim subject to that no one re-
ceives a negative amount). Another classical rule (analysed in Alcalde et al.
(2005)) is the Ibn Ezra (attributed to Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra in the 12th
century): this rule suggest that each individually claimed unit should be
divided equally among all agents claiming it. Formally, this rules can be
defined as follows.
The constrained equal awards rule, cea:
For each pE, cq in B and each i P N, ceaipE, cq ” min tci, µu ,
where µ is chosen so that
∞
iPN
min tci, µu “ E.
The constrained equal losses rule, cel:
For each pE, cq in B and each i P N, cel ipE, cq ” max t0, ci ´ µu ,
where µ is chosen so that
∞
iPN
max t0, ci ´ µu “ E.
The Ibn Ezra rule, IE:
For each pE, cq in B, such that cn § E, ci § ci`1, and each i P N,
'IEi pE, cq ”
iÿ
k“1
minpck, Eq ´minpck´1, Eq
n´ k ` 1 ,
where, for notational convenience, we will consider c0 “ 0.
Ibn Ezras recommendation can be understood as follows (see Alcalde
et al. (2005)): Let us consider that from the total amount to share r0, Es,
each agent i demands the specific parts of the state r0, cis; once the claims are
arranged on specific units of the estate in this way, Ibn Ezra recommends for
each unit equal division among all agents demanding it. Ibn Ezra gives an
example where an state E “ 120 must be divided between four agents with
claims 30, 40, 60, 120. The claims problem is pE, cq “ p120, p30, 40, 60, 120qq
and the IE rule proposes the following assignment: each agent receives c1n ; the
second and successive agents additionally receive c2´c1n´1 ; the third and fourth
agents will additionally receive c3´c2n´2 , and the last agent will additionally
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receive the remaining. In the numerical example that gives the following
sharing of the endowment:
IEpE, cq “ `304 , 304 ` 103 , 304 ` 103 ` 202 , 304 ` 103 ` 202 ` 60˘.
In order to compare the three solutions we have introduced, we obtain
the result of applying the cea and cel rules to this numerical example.
ceapE, cq “ p30, 30, 30, 30q celpE, cq “ `0, 203 , 803 , 2603 ˘.
To conclude this section, it is noteworthy that the concept of lower bound
has been always present as a crucial point in claims problems. Indeed, the
idea of pretending to ensure to each agent a minimal amount already appears
in the formal definition of a rule, by the non-negativity condition. In general,
a lower bound is a function such that for each claims problem pE, cq and each
agent i P N, bipE, cq is the minimal amount that agent i should receive in
this claims situation according to b. This lower bounds should fulfill two
conditions:
(i) Is rational : the guaranteed minimum is non-negative and lower that
the agent’s claim.
(ii) Is feasible: the estate allows to assign these amounts to the agents.
A general formal definition is given in Dominguez (2013).
A lower bound is a function, b : B Ñ Rn` which maps each problempE, cq P B, and each i P N, to a real number bipE, cq such that
(i) 0 § bipE, cq § ci
(ii)
n∞
i“1
bipE, cq § E
Curiel et al. (1987) introduced a lower bound, which is called minimal
right, which requires that each agent receives what is available whenever
the other agents have already received their claim, or zero if this is not
possible. Moulin (2002) introduces a lower bound, the fair lower bound,
which establishes that all agents should receive at least the amount assigned
to each of them in a equal division, or their full claim. Moreno-Ternero and
Villar (2004) propose a lower bound they call securement, that guarantees (if
possible) the n´ th part of each agent’s claim (in other case, it guarantees an
equal division of the endowment). Finally, a recent lower bound, min lower
bound, introduced in Dominguez (2013), proposes that each agent receives (if
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possible) the n´ th part of the smallest claim (in other case, it guarantees an
equal division of the endowment). Next, we introduce formally these lower
bounds.
Minimal right , (Curiel et al., 1987): for each pE, cq P B an each i P N,
mripE, cq “ max
#
0, E ´ ∞ cj
jPN ztiu
+
.
Fair lower bound , (Moulin, 2002): for each pE, cq P B and each i P N,
f li pE, cq “ min
 
ci,
E
n
(
.
Securement , (Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004): for each pE, cq P B and
each i P N,
SipE, cq “ 1n min tci, Eu .
Min lower bound , (Dominguez, 2013): for each pE, cq P B and each i P N,
mlipE, cq “ 1n min
!
min cjjPN , E
)
.
3. Axioms
Next we introduce some axioms, which are referred to some lower bound,
in order to analyze the claims rules satisfying such properties. The first one
is our basic requirement: the lower bound is respected by the claims rule.
Axiom RB. Respect of a lower bound b: for each pE, cq P B, and all
i P N , 'ipE, cq • bipE, cq.
RB requires that each agent should receive at least her lower bound (so
each agent has a guaranteed minimum level of awards).
Axiom ETEB. Conditional equal treatment with respect to a lower
bound b: for each pE, cq P B, and all i, j P N , ci § cj, bipE, cq “ bjpE, cq
implies 'ipE, cq “ 'jpE, cq, or 'ipE, cq “ ci § 'jpE, cq.
ETEB states equal treatment for equal agents (regarding their lower
bounds), unless one of them has her demand met in full. That implies
anonymity with respect to the claims. Note that the second part of the
axiom is required since by asking for equal treatment with respect to the
lower bound bi, it may lead to giving an individual more than her claim,
which is not possible in a claims rule.
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Axiom CRM. Conditional resource monotonicity with respect to
a lower bound b: if pE, cq, pE 1, cq P B are such that E ° E 1, then for all
i P N , 'ipE, cq ´ 'ipE 1, cq • bipE, cq ´ bipE 1, cq, or 'ipE, cq “ ci.
CRM, asks for a stronger condition: any change in the awards received by
each individual due to a change in the endowment E should be at least equal
to the change in her bound. As before, we need to restrict this idea in order
that no individual receives more than her claim.
Axiom CGS. Conditional group solidarity for equal changes in a
lower bound b: if pE, cq, pE 1, cq P B are such that E ° E 1, then for all
i, j P N , ci § cj, bipE, cq ´ bipE 1, cq “ bjpE, cq ´ bjpE 1, cq implies,
'ipE, cq ´ 'ipE 1, cq “ 'jpE, cq ´ 'jpE 1, cq, or 'ipE, cq “ ci § 'jpE, cq.
CGS requires that if the endowment increases, then this increment should
be shared equally among agents who experiment an equal change in their
lower bound. As before, this increment needs to be limited by the claim of
each individual.
Axiom PRI. Priority b: if pE, cq, pE 1, cq P B are such that E ° E 1, then
only for each i P N such that bipE, cq´ bipE 1, cq ° 0, 'ipE, cq´'ipE 1, cq ° 0.
PRI states that only those agents who increases their lower bound, should
increase their allocation.
4. Main results
In this section we provide some characterizations of the constrained equal
awards and Ibn Ezra rules. We analyze the e↵ect of each lower bound.
4.1. Fair bound
Our first result combines the property of Respect of a lower bound, with
Conditional equal treatment with respect to a lower bound. Theorem 1 shows
that with the fair lower bound, by requiring RB and ETEB, we retrieve the
cea rule.
Theorem 1. Let us consider the bound b “ f l. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying RB and ETEB.
Proof. It is clear that cea satisfies RB. In order to prove that it fulfills ETEB,
let us consider i § j such that f li pE, cq “ f ljpE, cq. If f li pE, cq “ ci, then
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ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq, unless ceaipE, cq “ ci § ceajpE, cq. Furthermore, if
f li pE, cq “ En : then ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq. So, the cea rule satisfies ETEB.
Now, for each pE, cq P B and each i P N, we are going to prove that a
rule ' satisfying axioms RB and ETEB coincides with the cea rule.
As E † ∞ni“1 ci † ncn, there is some k P N such that E † nck. If E † nc1,
then f li pE, cq “ En for all i P N and RB implies 'ipE, cq “ En “ ceaipE, cq for
all i P N , so we obtain in this case that ' “ cea.
In other case, there is some k P N such that nck´1 § E † nck. For all
i § k ´ 1, f li pE, cq “ ci, and for all i ° k ´ 1, f li pE, cq “ En . By RB and
claim-boundedness, for all i § k ´ 1, 'ipE, cq “ ci, and ETEB and e ciency
will imply an equal sharing of E 1 “ E ´ pc1 ` c2 ` . . .` ck´1q, among agents
i “ k, . . . , n, unless some of them gets more than her claim.
If E
1
n´pk´1q ° ck, then ETEB and claim-boundedness implies 'kpE, cq “ ck.
Now, by ETEB, 'ipE, cq “ 'jpE, cq, for all i, j ° k, and e ciency implies
'ipE, cq “ E´
∞k
i“1 ci
n´k for all i ° k, unless some of these amounts are greater
than the respective claims.
If E
2
n´k ° ck`1, E2 “ E´pc1`c2` . . .`ckq, ETEB and claim-boundedness
implies 'k`1pE, cq “ ck`1 and the remainder must be distributed equally by
ETEB. This argument is repeated until no one gets more than her claim, and
we observe that the result is 'pE, cq “ ceapE, cq.
Theorem 2 establishes that, if we use the fair lower bound, RB and ETEB
characterize the cea rule.
Theorem 2. Let us consider the bound b “ f l. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying ETEB and CRM.
Proof. Let ' a rule satisfying axioms ETEB and CRM. If we apply CRM to
problems pE, cq and pE 1, cq, with E 1 “ 0, then we obtain that RB is fulfilled.
So by applying the result in Theorem 1 we obtain that ' coincides with cea.
Now, we need to prove that the cea rule satisfies both axioms. It has been
proved that ETEB is satisfied. In order to prove that it fulfills CRM, let us
consider E 1 † E and i P N. If ceaipE, cq † ci, then ceaipE 1, cq † ci since cea
satisfies resource monotonicity. In this case,
ceaipE, cq ´ ceaipE 1, cq “
7
“
ˆ
E
n
` ceaipF, c´ f li pE, cqq
˙
´
ˆ
E 1
n
` ceaipF 1, c´ f li pE 1, cqq
˙
,
where F “ E ´∞ni“1 f li pE, cq; F 1 “ E 1 ´∞ni“1 f li pE 1, cq. So,
ceaipE, cq ´ ceaipE 1, cq • E
n
´ E
1
n
“ f li pE, cq ´ f li pE 1, cq.
If ceaipE, cq “ ci, the property is then fulfilled.
If we now combine the RB and CGS, again the cea rule is characterized.
Theorem 3. Let us consider the bound b “ f l. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying RB and CGS.
Proof. Let ' a rule satisfying axioms RB and CGS. If we apply CGS to
problems pE, cq and pE 1, cq, with E 1 “ 0, then we obtain that ETEB is
fulfilled. So by applying the result in Theorem 1 we obtain that ' coincides
with cea. Now, in order to prove that the cea rule fulfills axiom CGS, let
us consider i, j such that for some E ° E 1, f li pE, cq ´ f li pE 1, cq “ f ljpE, cq ´
f ljpE 1, cq, ci § cj. If f li pe, cq “ En , then f li pE 1, cq “ E
1
n . In this case, either (i)
ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq, so ceaipE 1, cq “ ceajpE 1, cq; or (ii) ceaipE, cq “ ci §
ceajpE, cq. Furthermore, if f li pE, cq “ ci, ceaipE, cq “ ci § ceajpE, cq. Hence,
the cea rule satisfies CGS.
As we have shown, CRM implies RB and CGS implies ETEB. So, by
combining CRM and CGS we obtain a new characterization result.
Theorem 4. Let us consider the bound b “ f l. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying CRM and CGS.
4.2. Min lower bound
Next, Theorem 5 shows that by using the Min lower bound, requiring RB
and ETEB also characterizes the cea rule.
Theorem 5. Let us consider the bound b “ ml. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying RB and ETEB.
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Proof. It is clear that cea satisfies RB. In order to prove that it fulfills
ETEB, let us consider i § j such that mlipE, cq “ mljpE, cq. If mlipE, cq “ En ,
then E § c1. Hence, ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq “ En . If mlipE, cq “ c1n , then
ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq § En , unless ceaipE, cq “ ci § ceajpE, cq. So, the cea
rule satisfies ETEB.
Now, for each pE, cq P B and each i P N, we are going to prove that a
rule ' satisfying axioms RB and ETEB coincides with the cea rule.
If E § c1, then mlipE, cq “ En for each i P N . By RB, for each i P N,
'ipE, cq • En . Thus, by e ciency, 'ipE, cq “ En “ ceaipE, cq, since En § ci for
all i.
If c1 † E †
n∞
i“1
ci, then mlipE, cq “ c1n , for each i P N . By RB, for each i P N ,
'ipE, cq • c1n . By ETEB, for each i, j P N such that mlipE, cq “ mljpE, cq,
'ipE, cq “ 'jpE, cq or 'ipE, cq “ ci § 'j. Then claim-boundedness by
e ciency reply 'i “ ci or 'i “ µ, such that ∞'i “ E that is, ' “ cea.
If E § nc1, then 'ipE, cq “ En “ ceaipE, cq, for each i P N .
If nc1 † E § pn ´ 1qc2 ` c1, by claim-boundedness, '1pE, cq “ c1. By
ETEB and e ciency, 'jpE, cq “ E´c1n´1 for each j ° 1 P N. So, 'pE, cq “
ceapE, cq.
Hence, for some k P N , if pn´pk´1qqck`
k´1∞
i“1
ci † E § pn´pk´2qqck´1`
k´2∞
i“1
ci, by claim-boundedness, 'ipE, cq “ ci, for each i § k´ 1 P N . By ETEB
and e ciency, 'jpE, cq “
E´k´1∞
i“1
ci
n´pk´1q for each j • k P N. So, 'pE, cq “ ceapE, cq.
The last result remains valid if we use the ETEB and CRM , as Theorem
6 shows.
Theorem 6. Let us consider the bound b “ ml. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying ETEB and CRM.
Proof. Let ' a rule satisfying axioms ETEB and CRM. If we apply CRM to
problems pE, cq and pE 1, cq, with E 1 “ 0, then we obtain that RB is fulfilled.
So by applying the result in Theorem 4 we obtain that ' coincides with cea.
Now, we need to prove that the cea rule satisfies both axioms. It has been
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proved that ETEB is satisfied. In order to prove that it fulfils CRM, let us
consider E 1 † E and i P N. If ceaipE, cq § ci, then ceaipE 1, cq † ci since cea
satisfies resource monotonicity. In this case,
ceaipE, cq ´ ceaipE 1, cq “
“
ˆ
E
n
` ceaipF, c´mlpE, cqq
˙
´
ˆ
E 1
n
` ceaipF 1, c´mlpE 1, cqq
˙
,
where F “ E ´∞ni“1mlipE, cq; F 1 “ E 1 ´∞ni“1mlipE 1, cq. So,
ceaipE, cq ´ ceaipE 1, cq • E
n
´ E
1
n
“ mlipE, cq ´mlipE 1, cq.
If ceaipE, cq “ ci, the property is then fulfilled.
Theorem 7. Let us consider the bound b “ ml. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying RB and CGS.
Proof. Let ' a rule satisfying axioms RB and CGS. If we apply CGS to
problems pE, cq and pE 1, cq, with E 1 “ 0, then we obtain that ETEB is
fulfilled. So by applying the result in Theorem 4 we obtain that ' coincides
with cea. Now, in order to prove that the cea rule fulfills axiom CGS, let us
consider i, j such that for some E ° E 1, mlipE, cq ´mlipE 1, cq “ mljpE, cq ´
mljpE 1, cq, ci § cj. IfmlipE, cq “ En , thenmlipE 1, cq “ E
1
n . In this case, either (i)
ceaipE, cq “ ceajpE, cq, so ceaipE 1, cq “ ceajpE 1, cq; or (ii) ceaipE, cq “ ci §
ceajpE, cq. Furthermore, if minblipE, cq “ ci, ceaipE, cq “ ci § ceajpE, cq.
Hence, the cea rule satisfies CGS.
We have shown that CRM implies RB and that CGS implies ETEB. So,
by combining CRM and CGS we obtain a new characterization result.
Theorem 8. Let us consider the bound b “ ml. Then, the cea rule is the
only one satisfying CRM and CGS.
4.3. Securement
From the results in the previous sub-sections we may ask if for every lower
bound b, the introduced axioms characterize the cea rule. We prove that this
is not true, since by using the securement lower bound Theorem 9 shows that
requiring RB, CGS and PRI retrieves the Ibn Ezra proposal.
Theorem 9. Let us consider the bound b “ Sl. Then, the IE rule is the
only one satisfying RB, CGS and PRI.
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Proof. In order to prove that IE satisfies RB, let us consider that for each
i P N , IEipE, cq • SlipE, cq “ 1nmintci, Eu. In doing so, IEipE, cq • cin •
SlipE, cq. By definition IEipE, cq “ IEi´1pE, cq` ci´ci´1n´pi´1q • cin . If IE satisfies
RB, then IEi´1pE, cq should be • ci´1n . It easy to see that if this hold,
then IEIpE, cq • cin • SlipE, cq. Hence by replicating the same reasoning
backwards, IE2pE, cq “ IE1pE, cq ` c2´c1n´1 • c2n , and IE1pE, cq • c1n , which
always hold by the defintiont of the IE proposal. So, consider that IE1 “ c1n ,
then, c2´c1n´1 • c2´c1n , and IE2pE, cq • Sl2pE, cq. Therefore, by backwards
induction, the IE rule satisfies RB.
In order to prove that IE satisfies CGS and PRI, by definition, if ci`1 °
E ° ci, for each j § i, IEjpE, cq “ c1n `
i∞
j“2
cj´cj´1
n´j`1 , and S
l
jpE, cq “ cjn ;
Furthermore, for each k • i ` 1, IEkpE, cq “ c1n `
i∞
j“2
cj´cj´1
n´j`1 `
E´ i∞
j“2
IEjpE,cq
n´k`1 ,
and SlkpE, cq “ En .
Now consider that the endowment increases, E 1 “ ci`1, then for each
j § i, IEjpE 1, cq “ IEjpE, cq, and SljpE 1, cq “ SljpE, cq. Furthermore, for
each k • i ` 1, IEkpE 1, cq “ c1n `
i∞
j“2
cj´cj´1
n´j`1 ` ci`1´cin´i`1 ° IEkpE, cq, and
SlkpE 1, cq “ ci`1n ° SlkpE, cq “ En . Hence, it is clear enough that only those
agents whose securement increases, increase their allocation. Therefore, the
IE satisfies CGS and PRI.
Finally, we are going to prove that, for each pE, cq P B and each i P N,
a rule ' satisfying axioms ETEB, CGS and PRI coincides with the IE rule
if bpE, cq “ SlpE, cq.
If E § c1, SlipE, cq “ En , so by RB and e ciency, 'ipE, cq “ En “
IEipE, cq.
If c1 † E 1 § c2, Sl1pE 1, cq “ c1n ; and, for all j • 2, SljpE 1, cq “ E
1
n . By
RB, '1pE 1, cq • c1n , and 'jpE 1, cq • E
1
n . By PRI and CGS, only agents j,
who have increased their lower bound, should be receive an equally increase
of their allocation, i.e., '1pE 1, cq “ c1n , and 'jpE 1, cq “ c1n ` E
1´c1
n´1 .
If c2 † E2 † c3, Sl1pE2, cq “ c1n , Sl2pE2, cq “ c2n , and SljpE2, cq “ E
2
n , for
each j • 3. By RB, '1pE2, cq • c1n , '2pE2, cq • c2n , and 'jpE 1, cq • E
1
n .
By PRI and CGS, only agents j, who have increased their lower bound,
should be receive an equally increase of their allocation, i.e., '1pE 1, cq “ c1n ,
'2pE2, cq “ c1n ` c2´c1n´1 , and 'jpE2, cq “ c1n ` c2´c1n´1 ` E
2´c2
n´2 .
11
This argument is repeated until the endowment is greater than cn, and
we easily observe that the result is 'pE, cq “ IEpE, cq.
4.4. Independence of the axioms
The following examples provide the independence of the axioms used in
some of the previous characterization results (we just do it with the fair lower
bound).
Example 1. Let n “ 3 and the rule 'a defined by:
'ai pE, pc1, c2, c3qq “ min
"
ci,
E
3
*
, for i “ 1, 2; and
'a3pE, pc1, c2, c3qq “ E ´min
"
c1,
E
3
*
´min
"
c2,
E
3
*
.
It is clear that 'a satisfies CRM and RB. But 'ap12, p1, 9, 10qq “ p1, 4, 7q,
whereas the constrained equal awards rule is ceap12, p1, 9, 10qq “ p1, 5.5, 5.5q.
So 'a does not satisfy ETEB, so neither does CGS.1
Example 2. Let n “ 3 and the rule 'b defined by:
'bpE, cq “ ceapE, cq, if f l1pE, cq “ f l2pE, cq “ f l3pE, cq;
'bpE, cq “ ceapE, cq ` p´x,´x, 2xq, if f l1pE, cq “ f l2pE, cq † f l3pE, cq; and
'bpE, cq “ ceapE, cq ` p´2x, x, xq, if f l1pE, cq † f l2pE, cq.
It is clear that ETEB and CGS are fulfilled. If we consider as in Example
1 the problem pE, cq “ p12, p1, 9, 10qq, then 'bpE, cq “ p0, 6, 6q, so RB and
CRM are not satisfied.
Example 3. Let n “ 3 and consider the cea rule. It is clear enough that RB
and CGS are fulfilled. If we consider the problems pE, cq “ p3, p3, 6, 9qq and
pE 1, cq “ p6, p3, 6, 9qq, then ceapE, cq “ p1, 1, 1q, and ceapE 1, cq “ p2, 2, 2q.
Note that spE, cq “ p1, 1, 1q, and spE 1, cq “ p1, 2, 2q, so PRI is not satisfied.
1 In fact, f lpE, cq “ p1, 4, 4q, so RB implies that the second and third agent get the
same amount, which is not the case with this rule.
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5. Final Remarks
5.1. Extending the obtained results
We want to emphasize that, as shown, the claims rule obtained by asking
some natural axioms crucially depends on the selected lower bound. We are
now working with the minimal right lower bound in order to analyze the
claims rule it defines when the equal treatment axiom is also required. We
are also working in combining our axioms in the case of the securement lower
bound in order to observe if we always retrieve the Ibn Ezra rule.
5.2. Duality
An important tool in the analysis of claims problems is the notion of
duality: what happens if we observe losings instead of awards? We know
that some rules are self-dual (distributing losses gives the same result as
distributing award). But this is not true in general. Then, the dual of a
claims rule ' its dual rule, 'd, assigns losses in the same way as ' assigns
gains (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), that is
'di pE, cq “ ci ´ 'ipL, cq.
We know that the constrained equal awards and the constrained equal losses
rules are dual of each other (Herrero, 2003). On the other hand, two prop-
erties are dual if whenever a rule satisfies one of them, its dual rule satisfies
the other.
The fair lower bound is defined by focusing on what claimants receive. By
switching attention to the losses they incur, lower bounds on losses become
upper bounds on awards.
An upper bound is a function, d : B Ñ Rn` such that for each pE, cq P B
and each i P N, dipE, cq is the maximal amount that agent i should receive
in the claims problem pE, cq according to d.
Fair upper bound , (Moulin, 2002) fu: for each pE, cq P B and each i P N,
fui pE, cq “ max
 
0, ci ´ Ln
(
.
Note that these bounds fu and f l are dual of each other (Moulin, 2002),
that is, fui pE, cq “ ci ´ f li pL, cq. Then, when a rule ' fulfills some axiom
with respect to the fair lower bound, its dual rule fulfills the dual axiom
with respect to the fair upper bound. The following result is an immediate
consequence of Theorems 1 to 4 and duality.
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Theorem 10. Let us consider the bound b “ fu. Then, the cel rule is the
only one satisfying:
1. RBd and ETEBd.
2. ETEBd and CRMd.
3. RBd and CGSd.
4. CRMd and CGSd.
The dual axiom of ETEB coincides with itself. The same occurs with
CGS. On the other hand, the dual axioms of RB and CRM are obtained by
reversing the inequality in the original properties.
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